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Executive Summary
This paper investigates the impact of a $1,000 refundable tax credit for self-only
coverage on net premiums and insurance purchases for a representative sam-
pie of potential buyers in the individual insurance market. Two methods
are used to estimate the distribution of premiums: predicted premiums based
on a sample of actual purchasers, and premium quotations drawn from an
e-insurance web site. In most of the simulations, the net premiums for half or
more of the prospective buyers are reduced to zero or low levels. The number
of uninsured is reduced by 21 to 85 percent, depending on the size of the de-
ductible in the benchmark plan. However, the results are sensitive to assump-
tions about insurer underwriting practices.
I.Introduction
One way to reduce the number of uninsured Americans is to help them
pay private health insurance premiums. Proposals for refundable tax
credits, such as those from the Bush administration or from members
of Congress, would offer many people credits or vouchers that could
cover part or all of premiums. For most of the currently uninsured, the
most convenient and most likely place to obtain insurance is the indi-
vidual market, and sometimes proposed credits would be limited to
use in such markets.
A key to understanding the possible impact of credits of different
amounts on insurance purchases is estimation of the extent to which
they reduce "net" premiumsthe market premium minus the
creditto moderate levels. Previous work has indicated that reason-
ably generous credits, on the order of about 50 percent of an average
premium, might reduce the number of uninsured by half or more.1104 Pauly, Herring, and Song
However, the measures of premiums in those studies were based
largely on estimates of individual insurance premiums generated by
applying industry-average administrative loading factors to expected
or average expenses, and the credit plans were hypothetical or sample
plans. An alternative strategy is to develop direct measures or esti-
mates of premiums that would be or have been charged in real-world
markets, apply the actual credits that would be offered under a specific
legislative proposal (or variation thereof), and calculate the net pre-
mium. One can then estimate the demand for insurance at that net pre-
mium. For people for whom the net premium is zero (credit exceeds
market premium), one would expect high, almost universal demand;
for people whose net premiums remain positive, estimates of the effect
of subsidized premium levels on the demand for insurance can gener-
ate estimates of the number of people who would be willing to buy at
least some insurance coverage at that price.
II.What Is the Price of Individual Insurance?
Only about 6 percent of Americans obtain private health insurance in
individual insurance markets. There are two commonly remarked
characteristics of such insurance. First, industry-level data suggest that
premiums are high relative to money benefits received. Since the pri-
mary benefit from insurance is the payment for medical services, these
data suggest that nongroup insurance is (relative to group insurance)
generally expensive for what one gets. It is widely believed that this
high "price" for benefits partially explains why only about one-quarter
of those who are not already covered by group or public insurance
choose to buy nongroup coverage. Second, it is commonly believed
that persons with higher expected expenses pay higher premiums in
the individual market. Pauly and Herring showed that this is only par-
tially true: premiums paid are higher for higher risk people, but they
increase significantly less than proportionally with premiums. They in-
crease with individual age and the costliness of the local health care
market, but (given age and location) they are not significantly higher
for people with chronic conditions or other high risk characteristics.2
Pauly and Herring attribute some of this behavior to the widespread
prevalence of guaranteed renewabifity provisions in individual insur-
ance policies. They do find, however, that premiums paid for similar
policies vary substantially for reasons unrelated to observable risk.
These observations suggest that it would be desirable to relate cred-
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as well as estimating the likelihood of purchase (or the proportion pur-
chasing) based on those net premiums and a model of the demand for
insurance. This is the task we perform in this paper. Specifically, we
will explore the impact on the net premium for self-only coverage of
flat dollar credits at a level of $1,000. This credit can be claimed for ei-
ther individual or group coverage. In the latter case, any tax subsidy
would be subtracted from the credit to be offered. We focus on the use
of the credit in the individual market. The conventional estimate of the
nongroup premium for comprehensive self-only coverage is about
$2,500, so such a credit would reflect an average subsidy of only 40 per-
cent. Because actual premiums vary considerably across persons, how-
ever, the actual net premium can likewise vary. For the take-up rates
presented in this paper, we examine long-run behavior so that any
short-run "friction" in take-up rates is not considered. Also, while most
proposals envision credits that phase out as income increases and that
are different for family coverage, we assume for simplicity here that
credits equal $1,000 for all individuals.
Two populations are of interest here. The most obvious group to
study is the population of people already purchasing individual cover-
age; for them, we know what insurance costs, and no estimation is in-
volved. For this population, we use evidence from a survey of a
representative sample of the U.S. population without group insurance
to describe premiums paid and some characteristics of insurance pur-
chased at those premiums. Second, the set of people who did not buy
insurance is also importantprecisely because this is the set of people
whose insurance-purchasing behavior tax credits are supposed to af-
fect. This population may have sought insurance but may have discon-
tinued searching after confronting premiums higher than the premium
they would have been willing to pay (their "reservation price"), or they
may not have searched at all. We develop several methods to estimate
the price (or distribution of prices) they would face.
Our work reported here supplements previous work by ourselves
and others.3 Our earlier work based measures of gross premiums not
on actual premium data but rather on estimates of premiums con-
structed using information about expected benefits and average ad-
ministrative loading in the nongroup insurance market. However, the
actual premiums people could pay or do pay may differ from these es-
timates because actual nongroup insurance premiums have a very
wide dispersion about the average.4
The other approach to estimating individual insurance premiums is
to use an average or median of premiums that insurers quote. In 2001,106 Pauly, Herring, and Song
this approach yields an estimate of average annual premiums for
self-only coverage of about $2,400 per year. However, no rational buyer
who has obtained price quotes would choose to pay the average or me-
dian price. Rather, the buyer would pay the lowest price (or something
close to it). In short, the most relevant measure for the analysis of a tax
credit is the premium actually paid by those who obtained insurance
and the lowest premium the person would have found for those who
do not purchase insurance. Either actual or potential transaction prices
may differ substantially from the average or typical premium posted
by insurers.
Our work reported in this paper generates estimates of net premi-
ums paid or payable for a representative sample of those who currently
do not obtain employment-based insurance coverage. This sample is
obviously more relevant than two self-selected samples recently dis-
cussed in the literature. One is the sample of people who chose to pur-
chase insurance on a large web site.5 Those who actually purchased
may have been the lucky few who were able to find low premiums;
others who visited the site may have seen premiums they regarded as
high and therefore decided to remain uninsured. That is, the popula-
tion of all purchasers and the premiums they paid may both differ from
those for users of the site, and many current nonpurchasers would not
have visited the site at all. In short, the sample of web site transactions,
while instructive, cannot be assumed to be representative of potential
nongroup insurance purchasers. The other sample is the "selected"
sample in a small number of cities or in high-risk categories for which
only familr premiums have been investigated, and for which high pre-
miums have been found.6 A more recent similar study presented pre-
miums and coverages for a small number of hypothetical buyers (in a
small number of cities) who list previous or current medical conditions
on their insurance applications.7 Our sample is also superior to these
two studies as a description of the effect of credits on the overall popu-
lation of potential nongroup purchasers.
Another way in which this work differs from some common policy
analyses is the treatment of tax credits in the case of people who face
positive net premiums. A typical approach implicitly or explicitly
judges the effectiveness of such a program by comparing the resulting
net premiums to the person's income and judges insurance to be less
"affordable," and therefore less likely to be purchased, if the net pre-
mium remains relatively high compared to income.8 However, there is
more involved in the purchase of insurance than only this kind ofTax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and the Uninsured 107
affordability Specifically, compared to people facing positive but lower
premiums, a person would be expected to be more likely (than some-
one charged a lower premium) to purchase insurance even at a rela-
tively high premium if the person expected substantially larger
benefits from the insurance. Since higher premiums sometimes (al-
though not always) reflect higher risk, we might expect that, at least up
to a point, higher risk people would be likely to buy insurance at mod-
erately high premiums if the insurance provides them with high levels
of benefit payments and/or shields them from high levels of out-
of-pocket payment. Consistent with this argument, the data suggest
that, even in the relatively low income (but not impoverished) popula-
tion, the proportion of people obtaining insurance is actually relatively
high among middle-aged people.9 Thus, translating net premiums into
probabilities of purchase will be an important adjunct to the estimation
of the determination of net premiums.
Therefore, we use several alternative estimates of the net price of in-
dividual insurance that a person might face. The most direct measures
use actual premiums paid by a random sample of nongroup insurance
purchasers. This sample illustrates the actual variation in premiums
paid, variation that is related both to pricing/search behavior and to
characteristics of insurance. For those who did not buy insurance, we
use two approaches to estimate the premium they would have paid. In
one, we use data on the characteristics of the uninsured to generate
premium quotations from an online web site. We specify the level of
coverage to be held constant, and we offer alternative simulations of
purchasing behaviorselecting either the lowest decile of premiums
or the premium at the lowest quartile. The second approach develops a
premium prediction regression from the data on actual purchases and
then uses this regression to predict premiums for the currently unin-
sured. (All of these approaches may be optimistic because we do not
know the actual rejected premiums, if any, of those who did not
purchase.)
It will be of interest to compare the net effect of various tax credits in
states with community rating laws and states without such laws. If
community rating laws reduce the extent to which premiums vary
with risk (their intended purpose), they will reduce the proportion of a
population with relatively high and relatively low net premiums. De-
termining the magnitude of the difference that laws actually make, and
the implications of these differences for insurance purchasing, wifi be
of value.108 Pauly, Herring, and Song
If we generate a pattern of estimated net premiums for the unin-
sured, how can we determine whether they would be willing to buy
coverage at those premiums? Just observing the distribution of net pre-
miums can tell us a great deal. Those who face zero or nominal net pre-
miums would be expected to take up the free or nearly free coverage.
But what wifi the other people who face positive but subsidized premi-
ums do?
The main approach we pursue here is to convert one of the distribu-
tions of net premiums into estimates of the distribution of insurance
purchases. We assume that people whose credit equals or exceeds the
premium for a given insurance policy, for whom the net price is zero,
would prefer to obtain that policy rather than remain uninsured. For
those with positive net premiums, we use the models developed by
Pauly and Herring to estimate the probability or proportion of insur-
ance purchasing.1°
Net Premiums Among Insureds
We examine a sample of persons purchasing nongroup insurance pro-
vided by the 1996-1997 Community Tracking Survey (CTS), a large
random household sample selected from a nationally representative
set of communities. Within the set of all individuals, 1,050 nonelderly
adult respondents reported purchasing nongroup insurance on a
self-only basis. Of this set, 908 (86 percent) reported the premiums
paid. All of these individuals are classified as "insured" in the analysis
of the data. The 1996 premium data are "inflated" to 2001 insurance
price levels by using an annual premium growth rate of 7 percent.
If we assume that each of these individuals would be eligible for a
$1,000 tax credit, the distribution of net premiums would be as indi-
cated in table 4.1. Approximately 20 percent of these purchasers would
pay a zero net premium. At the median net premium, the dollar
amount is $809 per year, which is 45 percent of the total premium.
About 60 percent of all purchasers would have had their premium
halved by a $1,000 credit. We also split the sample at the median in-
come and found essentially similar results for each subsample.
Online Premiums for Nonelderly Uninsured Adults
There were 6,083 nonelderly adults in the CTS sample who indicate
that they currently had neither public nor private health insurance. WeTax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and the Uninsured 109
Table 4.1
Distribution of net premiums for nongroup self-only policies under fixed $1,000 tax
credit plan
Representative sample of 821 nongroup policyholders in the CTS household survey
(1996-1997).
identified a comprehensive (indemnity or PPO) medical-surgical plan
with annual deductibles less than or equal to $1,000, or an HMO with
similar or lower deductibles. We then examined the publicly available
online premium quotations available from the e-healthinsurance web
site (www.ehealthinsurance.com) that would be available to the survey
respondents given their age, gender, smoking behavior, and zip code
location.
The lowest premium plan that meets these criteria is certainly a pos-
sible choice. If its premium were less than or close to the credit, it surely
would be preferable to the no-insurance option. In many cases, how-
ever, the absolute lowest priced plan that meets the deductible spe-
cification also has other exclusions; for instance, it may exclude
coverage of nonsurgical routine outpatient care entirely. Accordingly,
we show the net premium at the 10th and 25th percentile of the distri-
bution of premiums.
We were able to match 72 percent (N = 4,383) of the CTS sample with
web premiums. Failure to match usually was due to missing CTS data
(for example, smoking behavior), or to the absence of a web insurance
option in the sample person's zip code. The geographic patterns them-
selves are of interest. Web premiums were more likely to be missing for
people who lived in community rating states. The form of community
rating varies across the states that require it, with only New York and
New Jersey using pure community rating. Of the nine states identi-
fied as community rating states with cities in the CTS sample (New
York, New Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts, Kentucky, North Da-
kota, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont), there were no web site
Actual premium Net premium (NP)
NP as a percentage
of original premium
Mean $1,989 $1,122 36
10th percentile $708 $0 0
25th percentile $1,088 $88 8
50th percentile $1,809 $809 45
75th percentile $2,753 $1,753 64
90th percentile $3,932 $2,932 75110 Pauly, Herring, and Song
premiums available in six. In New York, the highest deductible listed
was $250. In the remaining community rating states (Washington and
New Jersey), median premiums were about three times higher than in
other states, presumably reflecting both higher premiums for given
coverage and less availability of high-deductible options. For example,
deleting the community rating states from table 4.1 would cut the net
premium at the 50th percentile in half.
Results of the analysis on the complete matched data set are shown
in tables 4.2 and 4.3. For the population of potential insurance purchas-
ers, the 10th percentile net premiums for insurance obtained from the
web are zero or close to zero for 50 to 75 percent of all such persons. As
in table 4.1, the top 10 percent of net premiums are quite large, reflect-
ing both the absence of a high-deductible option and high overall
health insurance premiums in some locations. If we move up the fre-
quency distribution of premiums to the 25th percentile, there is still a
sizeable proportion of the uninsured who can obtain insurance for free
and must pay net premiums that are a small fraction of the total. The
net premium at the 50th percentile is $252.
V.Estimating Premiums for the Uninsured Based on
Transactions Data
The third approach to generating a distribution of net premiums as-
sumes that uninsured persons would have available to them the same
premiums as those with similar characteristics who actually purchased
insurance. This approach also assumes that the uninsured would have
the same preferences for plan types and the same search behavior as
those who actually purchased. In reality, the uninsured probably
would search less, but they might also might seek less coverage than
those who purchased.
To generate a distribution of premiums, we first regress the premi-
ums paid by purchasers on purchaser characteristics. Table 4.4 shows
the result of such a regression. The most important predictive variables
turn out to be age, race, and community location. Given the distribu-
tion of characteristics of the uninsured, we then generate a distribution
of predicted or average premiums. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of
net premiums based on this approach. The distribution (perhaps not
surprisingly) is fairly close to the distribution of paid premiums, but
with a somewhat larger proportion of the population facing low net
premiums (since more of the uninsured are young).11Tax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and the Uninsured 111
Table 4.2
Distribution of net 10th percentile online premiums for uninsured individuals, under
fixed $1,000 tax credit plan
Representative sample of 4,383 uninsured individuals in the CTS household survey
(1996-1997). For each individual, the online premium reflects the 10th percentile
premium for a menu of individual health insurance plans (whose deductibles are no
greater than $1,000) in the corresponding locale. Premium quotes were obtained from
www.ehealthinsurance.com.
Table 4.3
Distribution of net 25th percentile online premiums for uninsured individuals, under
fixed $1,000 tax credit plan
Representative sample of uninsured individuals in the CTS household survey
(1996-1997). For each individual, the online premium reflects the 25th percentile
premium for a menu of individual health plans (whose deductibles are no greater than
$1,000) in the corresponding locale. Premium quotes were obtained from www.
ehealthirisurance.com.
NP as a percentage
Online premium Net premium (NP)
of original
premium
Mean $1,326 $508 27
10th percentile $478 $0 0
25th percentile $640 $0 0
50th percentile $984 $0 0
75th percentile $1,791 $791 44
90th percentile $2,884 $1,884 65
Online premium Net premium (NP)
NIP as a percentage
of original premium
Mean $1,631 $710 27
10th percentile $683 $0 0
25th percentile $873 $0 0
50th percentile $1,252 $252 20
75th percentile $1,995 $995 50
90th percentile $2,952 $1,952 66Table 4.4
Regression analysis of the determinants of health insurance premiums, population ages
18-64 with nongroup coveragea
Variable Coefficient
Male Age
Female
= 740, adjusted R-squared = 0.19.
bSigrjficant at 5%.
cSigIjficant at 1% or less.
18-24 -645.7
25-34 -600.3
35 14 -560.3
45-54 -187.0
Squared age 0.619
Smoker 179.3
White 149.4
African-American _921.3c
Hispanic 422.5
Family income 0.0042c
Family education
High school grad 207.4
Some college 162.4
College grad 262.8
Graduate school 63.25
Metropolitan area 210.3
New England 101.1
Mid-Atlantic 51.66
East S. Central 62.94
West N. Central 281.8
West S. Central 171.7
South Atlantic 82.00
Mountain 154.7
Pacific 252.1
Constant 1550b
18-24 -622.3
25-34 -715.0
35 14 -474.8
45-54 38.18
55-64 4042bTax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and the Uninsured 113
Table 4.5
Distribution of net predicted CTS premiums for uninsured individuals, under fixed
$1,000 tax credit plan
Representative sample of 6,083 uninsured individuals in the CTS household survey
(1996-1997). Premiums are predicted from estimated coefficients in a regression of
nongroup policyholder premiums on characteristics (see table 4.4).
VI.Simulating Underwriting
The estimates using the web data show the premiums that individuals
would see if they searched the relevant part of the web site, but the pro-
cess of obtaining coverage requires more than just agreeing tobuy at
one of those proposed premiums. (The estimatesbased on the CTS
"purchasing" sample already include any higher premiums based on
underwriting.) For new purchases of insurance (but not for renewals),
individuals must apply for coverage and will be asked questions about
health status and use of medical services in the recent past. If an indi-
vidual provides answers that suggest high risk, the insurer may decline
to insure or may propose a higher premium. While somehigh-risk
individuals obtain individual insurance coverage at premiums that do
not differ from the average, some do not.12
To simulate the operation of an underwriting process, we assume
that uninsured individuals in the CTS survey who report their health
on the survey to be "poor" or "fair" (whatever they mighttell an in-
surer), or who report that they were ever denied coverage, will be faced
with the premium in the 90th percentile of the distribution of premi-
ums for persons with their characteristics. Of the4,352 individuals in
the sample, 895 (18 percent) report that they were in poor or fair health,
and 202 report that they were ever denied coverage. Because of over-
lap, the net proportion of the sample thus classified as "high risk" is 21
percent.
Table 4.6 modifies table 4.3 based on these assumptions. It is stifi
true that more than one-quarter of all uninsured would face zero net
Predicted premiumNet premium (NP)
NP as a percentage
of original premium
Mean $1,558 $619 31
10th percentile $735 $0 0
25th percentile $1,166 $166 14
50th percentile $1,519 $519 34
75th percentile $1,864 $864 46
90th percentile $2,475 $1,475 60114 Pauly, Herring, and Song
Table 4.6
Distribution of net premiums after underwriting, under fixed $1,000 tax credit plan
Representative sample of uninsured individuals in the CTS household survey
(1996-1997). For each individual who reported no denial of coverage and good to
excellent health, the online premium reflects the 25th percentile premium for a menu of
individual health insurance plans in the corresponding locale. Those individuals
(approximately 20 percent of the sample) who reported fair or poor health or denial of
coverage were matched to the 90th percentile premium. Premium quotes were obtained
from www.ehealthinsurance.com.
premiums, but the net premium at the 50th percenifie rises a moderate
amount, to $390. The proportion who would be classified as high risk
by these assumptions is larger than the proportion of applicants insur-
ers estimate they would classify in this way.13 But probably many high
risks do not apply for insurance, both because they would not expect to
be quoted premiums they would be willing to pay and because high
risk especially characterizes low-income uninsured, who would often
not pay even average-risk premiums.
VII.Predicting Purchase
We now wish to determine whether uninsured individuals facing the
distribution of net premiums described above would be willing to buy
coverage. To produce estimates of such take-up rates, we use two simu-
lation techniques described in Pauly and Herring.14 One technique
constructs the distribution of the reservation prices directly and as-
sumes an individual will obtain coverage if the individual's reserva-
tion price exceeds the net premium he or she faces. The other technique
estimates an individual's probability of obtaining insurance as a func-
tion of the net premium; this model is derived from the observed rela-
tionship between coverage and net loading in the employment-based
setting.
For our first approach, we construct a "synthetic" estimate ofa reser-
vation price for insurance for an uninsured individual based on hisor
Online premium Net premium (NP)
NP as a percentage
of original premium
Mean $1,849 $936 31
10th percentile $663 $0 0
25th percentile $831 $0 0
50th percentile $1,390 $390 28
75th percentile $2,436 $1,436 59
90th percentile $3,962 $2,962 75Tax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and the Uninsured 115
her change in expected expenses for being insured relative to being un-
insured. Specifically, one's willingness to pay for insurance is specified
as the sum of the expected decrease inout-of-pocket expense, the Ar-
row-Pratt risk premium paid for the decrease in the variation in
out-of-pocket expense, the increase in consumer surplus from consum-
ing more medical care, and the reduction in disutility felt from free care
when uninsured. We set the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
coefficient equal to 0.00095 and assume that the increase in consumer
surplus equals half of the difference in total expenditures. Further, we
assume that the disutility associated with being acharity care patient
equals 20 cents per dollar of free care received; for more detail regard-
ing results generated from varying this assumption, see Pauly and Her-
ring (forthcoming).
Since the CTS lacks detailed data for medical expenses, we firstde-
veloped a distribution of reservation prices for a sample of individuals
in the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). Afterinflating
this data to 2001 dollars, we then assigned that distribution of reserva-
tion prices to the uninsured CTS sample by randomly selecting a reser-
vation price from an MEPS subsample of individuals with similar age,
gender, and self-reported health status.
Table 4.7 shows the distributions of reservation prices of the unin-
sured for three separate plans that were the most common of those
found online. The first is a PPO plan with a $1,000 deductible, 20 per-
cent coinsurance, and a $2,000 upper limit on out-of-pocketspending.
The second is a similar plan with a $500 deductible, and the third has a
$250 deductible. The assumptions we make for estimating an individ-
ual's reservation price for a particular plan are those that we presented
in the midrange case presented in Pauly and Herring.'5 As seenin the
table, the median uninsured individual would be willing to pay $592
for a $1,000 deductible PPO plan, $707 for a $500 deductible plan, and
$787 for a $250 deductible plan; these distributions are considerably
skewed.
To examine the level of subsidy required to induce theuninsured to
purchase insurance, we show the distribution of the difference between
an individual's reservation priceand the premium he or she faces. Ta-
ble 4.8 shows the distribution of subsidies needed when we assume
that the premium faced by an uninsured individual is at the 10th per-
centile of premiums quoted in our automated online search. The last
three lines of this table show the percentile at which thedifference
between our estimated reservation price and the premium theyface
falls below $1,000. For example, we find that 85 percent of theunin-116 Pauly, Herring, and Song
Table 4.7
Distribution of reservation prices for insurance, using an expected utility frameworka
aDetails of these simulations are provided in the text.
Table 4.8
Distribution of subsidies required for the purchase of insurance (assuming premiums ob-
tained are at the 10th percentile)a
aDetails of these simulations are provided in the text.
sured sample requires a subsidy of under $1,000 for the purchase ofa
$1,000 deductible PPO plan, while only 34 percent of the uninsured
would respond to such a subsidy for purchase ofa $250 deductible
plan. If we assume that all of those for whom the net premium falls be-
low their reservation price were to obtaincoverage, the take-up rate of
a $1,000 credit for a $1,000 deductible PPO would be 85 percent. Table
4.9 shows the distribution of subsidies needed whenwe assume in-
stead that individuals are able to obtain premiums only at the 25thper-
centile of those quoted for their specific age, gender, and location. The
subsidies reported here are larger.
Our expected utility model generates reservation prices for insur-
ance for the minority that fall below the unsubsidized premium (we as-
sume that) they face currently. We therefore present take-up rates of a
$1,000 deductible $500 deductible $250 deductible
Mean $534 $1,176 $1,615
10th percentile $0 $0 $0
25th percentile $0 $0 $487
50th percentile $168 $316 $1,464
75th percentile $608 $880 $2,312
90th percentile $1,480 $1,966 $3,524
85th percentile $1,000 NA NA
78th percentile NA $1,000 NA
34th percentile NA NA $1,000
$1,000 deductible $500 deductible $250 deductible
Mean $1,106 $1,245 $1,353
10th percentile $176 $240 $290
25th percentile $312 $395 $469
50th percentile $592 $707 $787
75th percentile $1,332 $1,513 $1,647
90th percentile $2,612 $2,900 $3,126Tax Credits, Subsidized Health Insurance Premiums, and theUninsured 117
Table 4.9
Distribution of subsidies required for the purchase of insurance (assuming premiumsob-
tained are at the 25th percentile)
$1,000 deductible $500 deductible $250 deductible
Mean $741 $1,580 $1,678
10th percentile $0 $0 $0
25th percentile $0 $156 $638
50th percentile $390 $866 $1,518
75th percentile $951 $1,500 $2,379
90th percentile $2,044 $2,798 $3,583
77th percentile $1,000 NA NA
57th percentile NA $1,000 NA
32nd percentile NA NA $1,000
Details of these simulations are provided in the text. Samples differ slightly due to the
unavailablity of certain plans in a few markets.
$1,000 credit using this "implied" take-up rate of unsubsidizedinsur-
ance as our baseline. For instance, weobserve that the 10th per- centile
"net" premium (i.e., the "absolute" premium minus the$1,000 credit)
for the $1,000 deductible PPO plan is less than our simulated reserva-
tion price for 85 percent of our sample of currently-uninsuredindivid-
uals However, the 10th percentile of the "absolute" premiumis
actually less than the reservation price we produced for 23 percentof
this sample of uninsured. We therefore present overall take-up rates us-
ing as a baseline this 23 percent of uninsured that ourmodel predicts
would have already purchased unsubsidized insurance. That is, the
overall take-up rate we present is equal to 62 percent, i.e., about 85 per-
cent minus 23 percent.
Table 4.10 shows more detail on the take-up rates that we estimate
for various assumptions about the plans facing the uninsured.If we as-
sume instead that the uninsured face the25th percentile of premiums
for a $1,000 deductible PPO, we estimate a lower take-up rateof 56 per-
cent. Assuming that the $1,000 credit is madeavailable only to a more
generous $250 deductible PPO, we estimate areduction in the unin-
sured of only 21 percent when we also assume that an individualfaces
the premium at the 25th percentile of online quotes. If we useinstead
the individual's predicted premium from the CTS nongroupsample of
purchases, we estimate a take-up rate of 43 percent. For this final case,
the distribution of reservation prices we apply is that for the typical
nongroup plan seen in the CTS followback data.118 Pauly, Herring, and Song
Table 4.10
Take-up rates of private insurance given a $1,000 refundable tax credita
The second column of table 4.10 shows the results generated from
applying a second estimation technique described in Pauly and Her-
ring.16 This second technique instead estimatesa reduced-form version
of the demand for insurance to produce an individual's likelihood of
obtaining coverage as a function of the net price sheor he faces. Spe-
cifically, using the MEPS data for workers and their dependents,we es-
timated a probit model for the probability of purchasing insuranceas a
function of one's age, gender, income, education,race, region, and the
net price one faces. Defining this "net price" in the traditional senseas
the administrative loading and as a percentage of expected benefits,we
constructed values for net loading determined by household marginal
tax rates and the administrative loading that coincides with the median
firm size in the worker's industry Thus, the coefficients from estimat-
ing this model for the probabffity of being insured as a function of these
various controls and the net price of insurance allows us to simulatea
new predicted probability of purchasing insurance given that unin-
sured individual's demographic controls and the "new" subsidized net
price. Here too, however, the take-up rate for insurance must bespec-
ified as the change in predicted probabilities from the unsubsidized
nongroup price to a subsidized one. If we consider the 25th percentile
of online quotes for a $250 deductible PPO plan and assumenongroup
administrative loading equal to 40 percent of premiums, we estimatea
32 percent take-up rate of a $1,000 credit for that insurance. If instead
we consider a $1,000 deductible PPO plan, the fixed-dollar credit low-
ers the net loading considerably; here, we estimate a take-up rate of 77
percent. If we assume that the premium faced by an uninsured individ-
Reservation
price approach
Net loading
approach
62% 85%
56% 77%
21% 32%
43% 61%
Premium assumption
Internet premiums, 10th percentile (of $1,000
deductible plans)
Internet premiums, 25th percentile (of $1,000
deductible plans)
Internet premiums, 25th percentile (of $250
deductible plans)
Predicted CTS nongroup premiums
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ual is the one we generate from the average CTS nongroup premium,
we estimate a reduction in the uninsured equal to 61 percent.
Overall, the take-up rates we estimate from our net loading
approach are somewhat higher than those we estimate from our reser-
vation price approach. As we argued before, however, this uncer-
taintywhether in the form of specifying a model or in the form of
assuming what premiums the uninsured faceshould be front and
center in the evaluation of tax credit schemes because we, as analysts,
have minimal experience with large subsidies directed at low-income
individuals.17
VIII.Discussion
The results in this paper yield estimates of the effectiveness of a modest
tax credit in reducing the number of a representative sample of unin-
sured that are consistent with, but somewhat more optimistic than, our
earlier conjectures, largely because the premiums we estimate or use in
this paper are generally lower than those used earlier. If the 10th per-
centile web site premiums represent genuine offers to sell insurance,
the results are even more optimistic. While many of the low-risk unin-
sured face low or zero premiums, however, the minority of people who
are high risk will still pay high net premiums. Our simulations indicate
that even many of these older or higher risks would be willing to pay
higher premiums because the alternative is to pay large amounts out of
pocket or put up with less attractive charity care. The main conclusion,
as we have noted before, is that fixed dollar premiums are less effective
than proportional or risk-adjusted premiums at getting a smaller num-
ber of higher risks covered, but they are more effective for the larger
number of lower risks. Indeed, without additional risk-adjusted credits
or a high-risk pool, it is unlikely that insurers will insure truly high
risks who seek coverage for explicitly acknowledged active medical
conditions.
Why do our results in this paper differ somewhat from our earlier
findings? It is possible that web premiums tend to be lower than actual
transactions premiums for people who did not use the web. Maybe the
benchmark loading estimates, which are based on aggregate premiums
and benefits for a set of large commercial insurers, are overestimates.
The Blue plans, which are active in the nongroup market, were left out
of some of these benchmark measures, as were some smaller commer-120 Pauly, Herring, and Song
cial insurers, and accident insurance was included with health
insurance.
The key remaining unknown for our study and all others, however,
is how underwriting affects the premiums people actually pay (not
what insurers quote). Our previous work indicated that many buyers
with a history of prior chronic conditions were able to avoid paying
unusually high premiums and were still able to obtain coverage. But
the nature of the interplay between sellers trying to charge high premi-
ums to high (and low) risks, and buyers searching for reasonable op-
tions, is unknown.
Current nongroup health insurance premiums are not set in expecta-
tion of purchases by a large number of formerly uninsured persons
armed with tax credits. Such a surge in demand would cause a pro-
found transformation of this small and sleepy market. What effects
might it have on premiums and coverage? We think it is likely that it
would lead to lower administrative costs and less severe problems of
adverse selection than nongroup insurers currently face, both because
of sheer volume and because most of these new purchasers would tend
to be average risks who are strongly motivated to seek coverage with
little selling effort needed. If these conjectures are right, the final out-
come could be even more optimistic than the estimates presented here.
It is also possible, however, that cautious insurers might respond by
raising premiums in the face of what is perceived as a more risky (or at
least different) market. Tax credits would put a heavy obligation on
nongroup insurers to offer attractive policies at affordable net
premiums.
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